Mirax: An Android Trojan That Takes Over Banking Apps Through Ads
Group-IB reported on 5 Nov 2026 that Mirax, an Android trojan reached through streaming-app ads, takes over banking apps in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa.

AegisAI Threat Watch · Android banking malware
Mirax: An Android Trojan That Takes Over Banking Apps Through Ads
Group-IB reported on 5 November 2026 that Mirax, an Android trojan sold on Russian-language forums, reached phones through ads in a streaming app and pulled bank-specific overlays from a server to take over banking apps across the Middle East, Turkey and Africa.
- What
- Mirax is an Android remote access trojan that Group-IB says took over banking apps for thousands of customers between March and September 2026.
- Who it hits
- Retail banking customers in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa, across 20+ target banking and wallet apps.
- Why filters miss it
- The installed app is thin. The bank-specific overlays are fetched from a server after the victim grants Accessibility access.
- Do today
- Hold transactions when a fraud alert shows remote-control signs, and block Accessibility grants to unvetted apps on managed Android devices.
Reported by Group-IB on 5 November 2026, with The Hacker News on the same date.
Mirax is an Android remote access trojan that Group-IB says took over banking apps for thousands of customers in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa between March and September 2026. Group-IB said the campaign was still running when it published on 5 November 2026.
Group-IB describes ad banners inside a free streaming app that lead to a dropper, which installs a payload posing as "Google Play Services". The payload asks for Android's Accessibility Service, a permission built to help users with disabilities. Once it is granted, the operator can read the screen, intercept one-time codes and open the victim's banking app. A device takeover (DTO) is fraud carried out from the victim's own phone. HTML overlay injection draws a fake screen, sent by a server, over a real banking app.
Analysis based on Group-IB research published on 5 November 2026, with one detail from The Hacker News. This campaign reaches phones through app ads, not email, so it sits outside the channel that email security tools inspect. The post is here for security teams that face the same fraud on the customer side and for staff whose phones touch work accounts. A related post covers another rented Android banking trojan.
Source: Group-IB, 5 November 2026. Group-IB estimates losses in the millions of US dollars from confirmed cases only and says the real figure is likely higher.
Key judgments
- Group-IB recorded thousands of infected Android phones among retail banking customers in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa (META), tied to a malware family it calls Mirax. Mirax has been sold on Russian-language cybercrime forums since December 2025, according to Group-IB.
- Delivery starts inside an app, not a message. Group-IB says there is no suspicious link in an SMS and no banking-themed lure. Its evidence suggests that ad banners in a free streaming app lead to a dropper downloaded outside Google Play. One dropper posed as "Tiktok 18+" and is not affiliated with TikTok.
- The installed app is deliberately thin. Group-IB says the HTML overlay templates and the target-app mappings are pushed from the command-and-control (C2) server at runtime, not shipped in the APK. Package names are randomized per build, the launcher icon is hidden and app names rotate.
- Group-IB says all samples carry the build tag "aquafina". The Hacker News reports that campaigns using Mirax are attributed to Aquafina, a threat actor known to be active since 16 March 2026.
- The money trail is partly unknown. Group-IB says unauthorized international transfers went to accounts abroad, that mule accounts may have been used to launder funds in India, and that tracing is ongoing.
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How does a streaming-app ad lead to the Mirax dropper?
Group-IB's evidence suggests the chain starts with a free video streaming app on Google Play. Ad banners inside the app lead users to a dropper that is downloaded outside the official store. Group-IB names no streaming app, but says apps it suspects as ad vectors remained available on Google Play when it published.
Group-IB describes one confirmed dropper as an adult version of TikTok called "Tiktok 18+". It says the app is not affiliated with TikTok. The dropper installs the Mirax payload, which presents itself as "Google Play Services" with a Cyrillic "о" in place of the Latin letter. Group-IB says on-device automation actively steers the victim toward granting Accessibility access.
What Group-IB reports about the first steps
| Step | What Group-IB reports |
|---|---|
| Initial access | Ad banners inside a low-reputation free streaming app lead to a dropper downloaded outside Google Play |
| Dropper | One observed dropper posed as "Tiktok 18+", an adult version of TikTok, and is not affiliated with TikTok |
| Payload name | "Google Play Services" with a Cyrillic "о" in place of the Latin letter |
| Permission | On-device automation steers the victim toward granting Accessibility access |
Source: Group-IB (5 Nov 2026). Group-IB hedges the ad-to-dropper link with "evidence suggests".
What can Mirax do after the victim grants Accessibility access?
Group-IB says Accessibility Service is the single permission that gives the operator full remote control. Its list of capabilities includes HTML overlay injection against banking, crypto, email and social apps, keylogging, SMS and notification interception for one-time code theft, and capture of the lock-screen PIN, password or pattern. It also lists hidden VNC or screen-sharing for real-time interactive control, and tap, swipe and text-entry commands that let the operator drive a banking app.
Group-IB says the target set holds 20 or more packages, mostly retail banks and digital wallets, plus a couple of global crypto exchanges. The build tag does not decide who is targeted. The target list comes back from the C2 server, so it can change without a new release. A February 2026 update added a SOCKS5 module that turns infected phones into residential proxy nodes.
Why does the overlay arrive from a server?
Group-IB reports that the overlay templates are not in the installed APK. They are pushed from the C2 server at runtime over a dual WebSocket channel on a single host, with an HTTP long-poll fallback. DNS-over-HTTPS is enabled by default. The server also sends the commands that drive the fraud.
Where each piece lives
| Component | Where it lives | Reported by |
|---|---|---|
| Streaming-app ads | Inside an app on Google Play | Group-IB |
| Dropper and Mirax payload | Downloaded outside Google Play | Group-IB |
| Bank-specific overlay templates | C2 server, pushed at runtime | Group-IB |
| Target-app list | C2 server response | Group-IB |
| Transfers | Accounts abroad, some suspected to be mule accounts | Group-IB, The Hacker News |
Source: Group-IB (5 Nov 2026), The Hacker News (5 Nov 2026).
Why do static scans and device reputation checks miss Mirax?
Group-IB says any detection strategy anchored solely to the installed sample is likely to stay a step behind. The installed app looks like a low-effort streaming client, and the capability that drives the fraud arrives later from a server. Group-IB also says the activity and the transactions come from the customer's own device, in the customer's own app, from the expected location.
AegisAI's analysis: a fraud system that scores device and location reputation would see familiar values on these transactions. Group-IB does not discuss such systems, and no reporting tested one against Mirax.
Where each control stands
Six controls are compared against the reported chain. The reports do not test any of them.
| Control | What it sees in this campaign | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Email gateway and link scanning | No email stage was reported | Applies only if a message carries a link to the app download |
| Store review of the streaming app | An ad-supported video app | Group-IB says suspected vector apps stayed available on Google Play |
| Static scan of the installed APK | A thin app; overlays are fetched later | Group-IB says a sample-only strategy lags the campaign |
| Device and location reputation scoring | Transactions from the victim's own device and location | AegisAI's analysis: familiar values; not tested in the reports |
| Accessibility grant policy on managed phones | A request from an app posing as "Google Play Services" | Can stop the chain at the permission step |
| Fraud alerts with remote-control signals | Screen-sharing or remote-control indicators during a transfer | Group-IB advises escalating these and holding the transaction |
Rows one and four are AegisAI's reading of the reported chain. The other rows restate Group-IB's wording.
Mirax turns one permission into a remote operator. The installed app shows little, and the server decides what the phone does next.
AegisAI Threat IntelligenceWhat this means for a bank, a fintech or an employer
This section is AegisAI's analysis. A bank sees a login and a transfer from a known device and a known place. An employer sees a phone that may hold work mail, a password manager or a banking app for a company account. The reports describe consumer banking customers, and none says work accounts were affected.
Exposure depends on three things: whether fraud teams can spot remote-control signals during a session, whether managed phones can refuse Accessibility grants to unvetted apps, and whether staff know that no system app asks for that permission through a pop-up.
How AegisAI protects against it
AegisAI has not observed this campaign. Group-IB places the lure in ad banners inside an app, not in email. The approach below applies where a message, such as a fake bank alert or a support email, carries a link to an app download.
AegisAI's agents evaluate the message and the destination it points to together, and pull a malicious message out of mailboxes before users see or click it. More on how that works: inbound email security.
When a lure or a compromised session is caught, the response compounds: the message is withheld at classification, copies already delivered are retracted, rewritten links refuse a late visit, the account's outbound and internal mail gets rescanned, and lateral phishing attempts to colleagues are blocked at the same bar rather than treated as a fresh, unrelated message.
Recommendations for defenders
- Put confirmed-affected devices under enhanced fraud monitoring. Escalate fraud alerts that show screen-sharing or remote-control indicators, and hold the transaction until the customer is verified.
- Keep package, certificate and C2 indicators current, because Group-IB says the campaign rotates identifiers. Watch for the overlay set to grow to new banks or regions.
- Contact customers on confirmed-affected devices to help them find and remove the malicious app with approved mobile security tools.
- On managed Android phones, block sideloading from unknown sources and restrict which apps may hold Accessibility Service. This is AegisAI's general guidance, not taken from the reports.
- Tell staff and customers the same rule: ads inside untrusted streaming apps are not a safe route to an install, and an app posing as "Google Play Services" that asks for Accessibility access should be declined and removed.
FAQ
What is Mirax Android malware?
Mirax is an Android remote access trojan that Group-IB tracks as a device takeover family. Group-IB says it has been sold on Russian-language cybercrime forums since December 2025 and was used against retail banking customers in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa between March and September 2026.
How does Mirax steal one-time codes and bank logins?
After a victim grants Accessibility access, Group-IB says Mirax intercepts SMS and notifications for one-time codes, captures the lock-screen PIN, password or pattern, and draws server-pushed HTML overlays over banking apps to collect logins.
What is the Aquafina campaign?
Group-IB says all the samples it examined carry the build tag "aquafina". The Hacker News reports that campaigns using Mirax are attributed to Aquafina, a threat actor known to be active since 16 March 2026.
Does Mirax spread by email?
The reporting does not describe an email stage. Group-IB says there is no suspicious link in an SMS and no banking-themed lure, and describes ad banners inside a streaming app that lead to a dropper. A message that links to an app download could still be one route, but the reports do not say that happened.
For researchers
What the reporting does not tell us 5 gaps
Scale. Group-IB gives "thousands" of phones and "thousands" of affected bank accounts from preliminary data, and says the true figure is likely higher. It publishes no exact count.
Losses and the money trail. Losses are estimated in the millions of US dollars from confirmed cases. Mule accounts "may have been used" in India, and tracing is ongoing. The Hacker News does not mention India.
The ad chain. Group-IB names no streaming app, ad network or dropper download host, and hedges the link with "evidence suggests".
Targeting. The build tag does not identify targets. The target list comes from the C2 response, and Group-IB gives no list of banks.
Delivery channel. The delivery described is app ads, not email. AegisAI did not test or observe any part of the chain.
Reported indicators 5 items
Infrastructure and package names change quickly. Treat these as historical indicators, not a live blocklist. Domains are written with [.] so they cannot be clicked.
| Type | Indicator | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | oscofneuid[.]com | Mirax command-and-control host |
| Domain | kenobuias[.]com | Mirax command-and-control host |
| SHA-1 | b9e84889c9760460f53c9b49cb43a636bb721d28 | Sample with package name net[.]wgrjvz[.]toolyt93a, installed 6 Aug 2026 per Group-IB's table |
| Build tag | aquafina | Found in the samples Group-IB examined |
| App label | "Google Play Services" with a Cyrillic "о" | Name the payload shows; Google Play Services is the real Android component it imitates |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping 6 techniques
These techniques are AegisAI's mapping of the reported behaviour onto the ATT&CK Mobile matrix. Group-IB's report shows ATT&CK mappings only as images and lists no IDs in its text. IDs and names were checked against attack.mitre.org on 19 November 2026.
| ID | Name | Use in this campaign |
|---|---|---|
T1655.001 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location | The payload shows the name "Google Play Services", with a Cyrillic "о" in place of the Latin letter. |
T1453 | Abuse Accessibility Features | Group-IB says Accessibility Service is the permission that gives the operator remote control. |
T1417.002 | Input Capture: GUI Input Capture | Server-pushed HTML overlays are drawn over banking apps to collect logins. |
T1417.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Group-IB lists keylogging and lock-screen PIN capture among the capabilities. |
T1513 | Screen Capture | Group-IB lists hidden VNC or screen-sharing for real-time control of the device. |
T1437.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | C2 runs over a dual WebSocket channel with an HTTP long-poll fallback and DNS-over-HTTPS. |
References 5 sources
- Group-IB (5 November 2026). From Streaming to Stealing: Mirax and the Rise of Server-side Android Device Takeover in META. group-ib.com
- The Hacker News, Ravie Lakshmanan (5 November 2026). ThreatsDay roundup, item on Android banking malware. thehackernews.com
- MITRE ATT&CK Mobile. Technique T1453. attack.mitre.org
- MITRE ATT&CK Mobile. Techniques T1417.001 and T1417.002. attack.mitre.org
- MITRE ATT&CK Mobile. Techniques T1655.001, T1513 and T1437.001. attack.mitre.org
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