What is business email compromise, and why is there no link to scan?
Business email compromise is a text-only fraud with no link or file to scan. See why SPF, DKIM and DMARC can pass, the signals left, and a callback process.

Business email compromise (BEC) is fraud by email in which an attacker poses as an executive, a vendor, an employee or a lawyer to get someone to send money or change payment details. There is no link to scan because the message is plain text. The request is the attack, so a scanner that checks links and files has nothing to check.
The FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report lists BEC losses of $3,046,598,558, second only to investment fraud.1 The defence that works is to check the request itself, and to confirm any payment change by phone.
Why a text-only email gives scanners nothing to check
Most BEC does not carry malware. NCSC Ireland says "Most BEC attacks do not involve malware" and that traditional antivirus will not catch them.2 The email asks a person to act and gives a browser nothing to load.
Not every BEC email is text only. The FBI notes that AI-written BEC emails "can contain phishing links or directions to wire funds".1 The common case, and the hard one, has neither. A link scanner, a file sandbox and an antivirus engine each inspect an object, and a plain request contains no object.
Why SPF, DKIM and DMARC can pass on a fraud email
SPF, DKIM and DMARC confirm that a domain sent a message. They do not confirm that the person who owns the account wrote it. Two common BEC routes pass all three checks.
The first is a compromised real account. A hijacked vendor mailbox sends from the vendor's own domain through its own servers, so every check passes. This is our reading of how the checks work, and AegisAI's BEC page makes the same point: a hijacked vendor mailbox "signs as itself".3
The second is a look-alike domain. Microsoft states that impersonation "can pass email authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) if the attacker created a lookalike domain and published valid DNS records".4 Microsoft describes DMARC as validating the domain in the From address,5 so a domain the attacker owns passes its own checks.
The common forms of BEC and the signals that remain
The four common forms
NCSC Ireland lists four common scenarios.2
| Form | What the attacker asks for |
|---|---|
| CEO fraud | An urgent wire transfer, posing as an executive |
| Vendor bank detail change | Fake invoices or changed payment details, sent from a compromised vendor email |
| Payroll diversion | A change to an employee's direct deposit account, sent to HR or payroll |
| Attorney impersonation | Action on a confidential matter, posing as legal counsel |
The NHS Counter Fraud Authority adds that fraudsters "monitor, hack, or spoof (copy) email accounts" and use "genuine information about the employee or supplier" to win trust.6
The five signals left
When every technical check passes, five signals are left. NCSC Ireland names most of them as warning signs.2
- Request type. The email asks for a wire, a gift card or a change of payment route, or for secrecy ("urgency, secrecy, external domains, unusual tone").
- Payment change. NCSC Ireland lists "unexpected payment requests or changes to payment instructions". A first-ever bank change from a long-standing vendor deserves the callback below.
- Reply-to mismatch. The From address looks right, but replies go to a different address. AegisAI's BEC page shows an illustrative example where replies route to a six-day-old look-alike domain.3
- Look-alike domain. NCSC Ireland lists "slightly altered email addresses or domain names". One added word or swapped letter is enough.
- Tone and relationship break. The sender asks you to skip the normal process, or writes unlike their usual messages.
No single signal proves fraud. Together they decide whether to pick up the phone.
How to verify a payment change by callback
In our reading, the callback works because the attacker controls the email thread but not the phone line you already hold. Run it on every request to change bank details, payroll deposits or payment instructions.
- Hold the payment. In your accounts payable system or ticket queue, mark the change request "verify first" and stop all payments to that account until the call is logged.
- Get the number from your own records. Open the vendor master record or HR file and copy the phone number saved before the request. The NHS Counter Fraud Authority says contact details "should be taken from existing records" and not from the change request.6 Do not use the number in the email or its signature.
- Call and ask for the details to be stated. Ask the contact to confirm that they sent the change, and to read out the new account details before you read anything. Then ask about something that was never in email, such as a detail from an earlier call. This is our reasoning, because an attacker inside a mailbox can read every message in it.
- Get a second approver. In your payment system, have a person who did not read the email approve the change. NCSC Ireland asks for dual approval of financial transactions over a set threshold.2 Applying it to every bank-detail change is our recommendation, because that one change decides where every later payment goes.
- Log the call. In the vendor record, note who you spoke to, the number dialled, the time and the outcome. Release the payment only after the entry exists.
- Escalate a failed call. If the contact cannot confirm the change, or offers a different number, keep the hold, tell your IT security team, and report it to the vendor on the number you already held. NCSC Ireland says a quick update to bank details "should always trigger a phone call".2
How AegisAI handles business email compromise
AegisAI reads a payment-change email the way an analyst would, looking at the sender's history, the change being asked for and where the reply goes.3 Every verdict arrives with the evidence, so an analyst can confirm it in seconds.3
Because authentication passes for a hijacked vendor account, AegisAI does not rely on it. The verdict rests on what this sender has sent you before and on the request itself.3 The sender history comes from your own mail, over the same API connection, with nothing to import or configure.3
AegisAI connects by API and works after delivery. The median verdict takes 1.9 seconds, then the email is removed from every mailbox that received it.3 It can run in monitoring mode on live mail with no MX record change before removal is turned on.3 It may occasionally flag a legitimate bank change, and when it does the evidence is attached for an analyst to clear.3
When the vendor's or your own account is the problem, AegisAI's account takeover protection watches sign-ins and mailbox activity per account and raises one explained finding when behaviour stops matching the owner.7 It is in early access and does not revoke sessions today. Your team revokes them in Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace.7 On Microsoft 365, sign-in reports need Entra ID P1.7 AegisAI does not replace the callback or the second approver. Those stay in your payment process.
To see a payment request checked against its sender's history, book a demo.
Frequently asked questions
What is business email compromise in one sentence?
Business email compromise is fraud in which an attacker uses a trusted identity in email to get staff to send money or change payment details2. The identity is usually an executive, a vendor, an employee or a lawyer.
Why is there no link to scan in a BEC email?
Most BEC does not involve malware, and many messages carry no link or file2. That leaves the request as the only thing to judge.
Does DMARC stop business email compromise?
No, not on its own. It checks the domain in the From address.5 It does not stop a look-alike domain with valid records,4 and in our reading it does not stop a compromised real account, which sends from the genuine domain.
Which phone number should I call to verify a bank change?
Use the number already in your vendor or HR record6. Never use the one in the change request or the email signature.
Is a callback enough on its own?
No. Add a second approver and a logged record of the call, as in steps 4 and 5 above. Without them, the call is easy to skip under time pressure, which is our reading.
Sources
Each number in the text opens the source with the same number.
- 1FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center2025 Internet Crime Report
- 2NCSC IrelandProtecting Against Business Email Compromise and Payment Fraud, 25 July 2025
- 3AegisAIBEC and vendor fraud protection
- 4Microsoft LearnAnti-phishing policies in Microsoft 365, updated 20 August 2026
- 5Microsoft LearnSet up DMARC to validate email in Microsoft 365, updated 3 July 2026
- 6NHS Counter Fraud AuthorityPayment Diversion Fraud quick reference guide, July 2026
- 7AegisAIAccount takeover protection (early access)
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