HelloFriends: A Fake FMCSA Portal That Harvests Fuel Card Logins
ANY.RUN reported on 17 Nov 2026 that HelloFriends sends fake FMCSA emails to US trucking firms, then asks for SSNs, a supposed $300 fee and fuel card logins.

AegisAI Threat Watch · credential phishing
HelloFriends: A Fake FMCSA Portal That Harvests Fuel Card Logins
ANY.RUN reported on 17 November 2026 that HelloFriends sends US trucking companies fake FMCSA emails that lead to cloned SAFER and Motus portals, which ask for identity details, a supposed $300 fee and fuel card logins.
- What
- HelloFriends sends US trucking companies fake FMCSA emails that lead to cloned SAFER and Motus pages and then to fuel card logins.
- Who it hits
- Staff at US carriers who receive an email signed as FMCSA that quotes the company's own USDOT number.
- Why filters miss it
- The attacker owns the sender domain, so SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, and the pages show real carrier data.
- Do today
- Tell staff the only Motus address is motus.dot.gov and no login is entered from an email link.
Reported by ANY.RUN on 17 November 2026, with context from FMCSA warnings and NMFTA.
HelloFriends is a phishing operation, named by ANY.RUN, that sends US trucking companies emails posing as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and leads recipients to cloned carrier portals that ask for identity details, a supposed $300 fee and fuel card logins.
FMCSA is the US federal regulator for commercial trucking. A USDOT number is the identifier a carrier holds with it. SAFER is the FMCSA's carrier safety record system, and Motus is its carrier registration system. A fuel card is a payment card that fleets use at fuel stops, issued by providers such as Relay, Comdata, WEX, EFS and Fleet One.
Analysis based on ANY.RUN's report of 17 November 2026, which describes HelloFriends alongside two other logistics campaigns. Context comes from FMCSA warnings about fake Motus sites, reported by FreightWaves on 15 September 2026, and from an NMFTA article on cargo crime. The report gives no start date and no victim count. A related post covers phishing emails that pass SPF and DKIM.
Source: ANY.RUN, 17 November 2026. The domain count is ANY.RUN's approximate figure. The provider list is introduced with "such as", so it may not be complete.
Key judgments
- The sender passes email authentication. In one analysed email, ANY.RUN reports a sender domain the attacker controls, the recipient's real USDOT number and a signature as an FMCSA representative. SPF, DKIM and DMARC passed.
- The portal shows something real first. The SAFER clone displays real carrier information next to a "NOT AUTHORIZED" status, and the Motus clone asks for an access code that ANY.RUN says gives access to a real carrier record.
- The portal asks for more than a login. The pages ask for a Social Security number, an Employer Identification Number (EIN), a date of birth and contact details, a supposed $300 fee and a fuel card login.
- A rejected password comes first. In the observed Relay and Comdata flows, the first password is deliberately rejected, which leads to a second password and then an SMS or six-digit code.
- Domains rotate but patterns repeat. ANY.RUN counts approximately 1,430 domains in 2026 and says recurring image paths, page resources and exfiltration endpoints link them.
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How does a fake FMCSA email pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
It passes because the attacker registered the sending domain and published its own authentication records. ANY.RUN reports that one analysed email came from dotcompanyinfo[.]com, a domain the attackers controlled, so all three checks passed. These checks show that the domain's owner approved the message. They do not show that the owner is who the message claims to be.
The same email quoted the recipient's real USDOT number and was signed as an FMCSA representative, according to ANY.RUN. The report does not print the email's full text and does not say how the attackers obtained the numbers. An NMFTA director of cybersecurity, writing in a sponsored article on BleepingComputer on 14 May 2026, describes freight-targeting criminals researching public sources such as USDOT numbers before phishing staff. That describes the wider trade, not this campaign.
What the email shows and what it proves
The table separates each signal from what it shows about the sender. It is AegisAI's reading of the reported details.
| Signal in the email | What was reported | Does it show the sender is FMCSA? |
|---|---|---|
| SPF, DKIM and DMARC | All passed in the one analysed email | No. It shows the owner of dotcompanyinfo[.]com sent it |
| Recipient's USDOT number | Real and correct | No. NMFTA says criminals research public sources such as USDOT numbers |
| Signature as an FMCSA representative | Present | No. It is text anyone can type |
What does the HelloFriends portal ask for?
ANY.RUN describes a cloned SAFER page and a cloned Motus page that ask for identity details, a fee and fuel card logins. ANY.RUN does not number the requests, so the list below does not claim an order.
- The link opens a clone of SAFER or Motus. The SAFER clone, hosted on dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview[.]info, shows the carrier's real information next to a "NOT AUTHORIZED" operating status.
- The Motus clone asks for a personal access code before it shows a dashboard that presents USDOT reactivation as an urgent administrative requirement. ANY.RUN's caption says the code gives access to a real carrier record.
- The page asks for a Social Security number, an EIN, a date of birth and contact details.
- The page asks for a supposed $300 administrative fee.
- The page asks the victim to connect a fleet fuel card provider, such as Relay, Comdata, WEX, EFS or Fleet One. Choosing one opens a phishing login. ANY.RUN lists motus.relayconsolidation[.]online as the fake Relay login and motus.iconnectdataconsolidation[.]online as the fake Comdata login.
- In the observed Relay and Comdata flows, the first password is deliberately rejected. The page then asks for a second password and an SMS or six-digit one-time code.
Source: ANY.RUN, 17 November 2026. The report does not say whether any fuel card was misused or any fee was paid.
Why a rejected first password helps the attacker
ANY.RUN describes the sequence. The purpose below is AegisAI's reading. A deliberate rejection makes the victim type the password twice, so the attacker holds two entries to compare. The code request then arrives while the victim is already working through the form. The page collects both a password and a one-time code.
How does the stolen data reach the attackers?
The pages are Next[.]js applications hosted on Vercel, and they send stolen data to a server rather than straight to the attacker's chat. ANY.RUN reports that, instead of contacting Telegram from the browser, the pages post to server-side endpoints such as /api/send-telegram and /api/send-to-telegram. A Vercel function then forwards the data to Telegram. Message labels such as FULL OBJECT, Hello Friends and Heyyy mark different stages of the attack.
ANY.RUN reports approximately 1,430 domains tied to HelloFriends in 2026 and says the domains rotate often. The recurring parts are image paths such as /motusiks.png, page resources and the exfiltration pattern. ANY.RUN presents these as the way to link new domains to the same operation, so a single domain is a weak indicator.
Why does a passing authentication check not make this email safe?
This section is AegisAI's analysis. A pass means the sender is who the domain says it is, and here the domain belongs to the attacker. A control that treats an authenticated sender as trustworthy gains nothing. The portal names also borrow official wording. In dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview[.]info, the registered domain is saferprofilereview[.]info, and the leading words only look like an agency address. FreightWaves reports that FMCSA's fraud alerts name motus.dot.gov as the only legitimate Motus address. The fake Motus login hosts in this campaign sit on relayconsolidation[.]online and iconnectdataconsolidation[.]online.
Where each control stands
Six controls are compared against the reported chain. The reports do not test any of them.
| Control | What it sees in this campaign | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Trust a sender that passes SPF, DKIM and DMARC | A domain the attacker owns, with valid records | Does not help: all three passed in the analysed email |
| Block list of the reported domains | dotcompanyinfo[.]com and the portal domains | Helps for those, but ANY.RUN counts approximately 1,430 domains in 2026 |
| Search web and DNS logs for the recurring artifacts | Requests for /api/send-telegram and /motusiks.png | ANY.RUN's suggested pivot; it finds visits after the fact |
| Check the registered domain, not the leading words | saferprofilereview[.]info against fmcsa.dot.gov | Can expose the lookalike, and motus.dot.gov is the only legitimate Motus address |
| Fuel card provider controls | A working login plus a one-time code | Can limit what a stolen login does; the reports do not say whether any card was misused |
| Reading the message and its link | A compliance notice whose link opens a non-government page that asks for a login | Can be flagged when it arrives by email |
AegisAI's reading of the reported chain. The reports do not test any of these controls.
The sender domain was owned by the sender, the USDOT number was the recipient's own and the carrier record on the page was real. The false claim was the sender's identity: the message did not come from FMCSA.
AegisAI Threat IntelligenceWhat this means for a trucking or logistics security team
This section is AegisAI's analysis. Compliance mail is expected at a carrier, so staff have a reason to act on it quickly, and the first pages they reach show true data about their own company. Exposure depends on three things: whether one person owns FMCSA notices, whether anyone would type an SSN or EIN into a page reached from an email link, and whether fuel card logins are shared or lack their own limits and alerts.
The identity data in this campaign has a longer life than a password. A Social Security number or an EIN cannot be reset the way a fuel card password can. The report does not say what the attackers did with the data they collected.
Why standard controls miss it
This section is AegisAI's analysis. Authentication passes. The link points to a fresh domain, and with approximately 1,430 domains in 2026, many may not be on a block list yet. The page shows real carrier data, so it reads as correct. The first password is rejected, which looks like an ordinary typo. The data leaves through a server function on a mainstream host, so no unusual destination appears in the victim's browser traffic.
How AegisAI protects against it
AegisAI has not observed this campaign. ANY.RUN describes an email with a link to a cloned portal but does not say how many messages were sent or whether every victim arrived by email. The approach below applies where such a message reaches a mailbox.
AegisAI's agents evaluate the message and the destination it points to together, and pull a malicious message out of mailboxes before users see or click it. More on how that works: inbound email security.
When a lure or a compromised session is caught, the response compounds: the message is withheld at classification, copies already delivered are retracted, rewritten links refuse a late visit, the account's outbound and internal mail gets rescanned, and lateral phishing attempts to colleagues are blocked at the same bar rather than treated as a fresh, unrelated message.
Recommendations for defenders
- Name one owner for FMCSA, USDOT and Motus notices. Treat a message that asks for a login, an SSN, an EIN or a fee as unverified until that owner checks it by typing the agency address, motus.dot.gov for Motus, rather than using the link.
- Set a rule that no SSN, EIN or fuel card login is entered on a page reached from an email link, give staff one place to report such emails, and write down the response when one was entered.
- Do not treat a pass on SPF, DKIM or DMARC as proof of identity. Review mail that cites FMCSA, USDOT or Motus when the sender is not on an agency address.
- Ask fuel card providers about per-driver logins, spend limits and alerts. If a login was entered on a suspect page, change the password, revoke access and tell the provider.
- Search web proxy and DNS logs for the reported domains and for requests to /api/send-telegram and /motusiks.png, as historical indicators. Where an SSN or EIN was entered, treat it as exposed and take identity protection steps.
FAQ
What is the HelloFriends FMCSA phishing campaign?
HelloFriends is a phishing operation that ANY.RUN reported on 17 November 2026. It sends US trucking companies emails posing as the FMCSA and leads recipients to cloned SAFER and Motus pages that ask for identity details, a supposed $300 fee and fuel card logins with one-time codes.
How can a phishing email pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
The attacker can register a domain and publish valid records for it. ANY.RUN reports that one analysed HelloFriends email came from such a domain, dotcompanyinfo[.]com. The checks confirm that the domain's owner approved the message, not that the owner is honest.
Is the $300 USDOT reactivation fee real?
ANY.RUN describes the $300 as a supposed administrative fee on a cloned portal. To check any request for a fee, go to FMCSA directly by typing the address. FreightWaves reports that FMCSA names motus.dot.gov as the only legitimate Motus address.
What should I do if I entered my SSN or fuel card login on one of these pages?
Tell your IT or security team and your fuel card provider at once, change the passwords you entered from a different device, and ask the provider to review recent activity. For an SSN or EIN, consider a credit freeze and identity protection. These steps are AegisAI's general guidance, not taken from the report.
For researchers
What the reporting does not tell us 5 gaps
Scale and timing. ANY.RUN gives no start date, no email volume and no victim count. The only figure is approximately 1,430 domains in 2026.
The operator. The report makes no attribution to a named actor.
The email. The report does not print a full message or say what it claims about the carrier. It says only that the email names the real USDOT number and is signed as an FMCSA representative.
Where the numbers came from. ANY.RUN does not say how the attackers obtained USDOT numbers. NMFTA's article is a sponsored piece on BleepingComputer about the wider trade, not about HelloFriends.
Losses. The report does not say whether any fee was paid or any fuel card was misused. AegisAI did not test the pages.
Reported indicators 7 items
Indicators from ANY.RUN's report, defanged. With approximately 1,430 domains in 2026, treat these as historical indicators, not a live blocklist. ANY.RUN's report links a sandbox analysis for more detail.
| Type | Indicator | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | dotcompanyinfo[.]com | Sender domain of the analysed email and SAFER landing domain |
| Domain | dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview[.]info | SAFER clone |
| Domain | motus.relayconsolidation[.]online | Fake Relay login |
| Domain | motus.iconnectdataconsolidation[.]online | Fake Comdata login |
| URL path | /motusiks.png | Recurring image path on Motus clones |
| URL path | /api/send-telegram | Server-side endpoint that relays data to Telegram; /api/send-to-telegram is a second name |
| Message label | FULL OBJECT | Label on exfiltrated data; Hello Friends and Heyyy mark other stages |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping 6 techniques
These techniques are AegisAI's mapping of the reported behaviour. ANY.RUN does not map HelloFriends to technique IDs. IDs and names were checked against attack.mitre.org on 18 November 2026.
| ID | Name | Use in this campaign |
|---|---|---|
T1583.001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | The operators used attacker-owned domains for sending and for the cloned portals. |
T1583.007 | Acquire Infrastructure: Serverless | The pages ran on Vercel, and a Vercel function relayed the stolen data. |
T1566.002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link | The email carried a link to a cloned SAFER or Motus page. |
T1598.003 | Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link | The portals collected SSNs, EINs, dates of birth, a fee and fuel card logins. |
T1111 | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | The fuel card flow asked for an SMS or six-digit code after the second password. |
T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | Stolen data was forwarded to Telegram through a server function. |
References 4 sources
- ANY.RUN (17 November 2026). US logistics cyber threats: 3 campaigns. any.run
- FreightWaves, Phil Brink (15 September 2026). FMCSA warns trucking companies about 4 fake Motus registration sites. freightwaves.com
- NMFTA, Ben Wilkens, sponsored article on BleepingComputer (14 May 2026). Cyber-Enabled Cargo Crime: How Cybercrime Tradecraft is Used to Steal Freight. bleepingcomputer.com
- MITRE ATT&CK. Techniques T1583.001, T1583.007, T1566.002, T1598.003, T1111 and T1567. attack.mitre.org
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