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Fake Zillow Reviews: A ClickFix Check That Installs NetSupport RAT

EfficientIP's 12 Nov 2026 research: fake Zillow apartment-review pages use a ClickFix check to get renters to paste a command that installs NetSupport RAT.

Fake Zillow Reviews: A ClickFix Check That Installs NetSupport RAT

AegisAI Threat Watch · Social engineering

Fake Zillow Reviews: A ClickFix Check That Installs NetSupport RAT

EfficientIP Research Labs, 12 November 2026: fake Zillow apartment-review pages show a verification check, copy a command to the clipboard and talk the visitor into running it, which installs NetSupport remote control that restarts at every login.

TL;DR
What
Fake Zillow review pages copy a command to the clipboard and talk the visitor into running it. The command installs NetSupport RAT.
Who it hits
Renters, and anyone who checks listings on a work laptop, per Help Net Security.
Why filters miss it
There is no attachment and no exploit. The visitor runs the command, and the downloader connects to a bare IP address with no DNS lookup.
Do today
Alert on scripts launched from the Run dialog, and check workstations for a NetSupport folder under AppData.

Reported by EfficientIP Research Labs, 12 November 2026.

A ClickFix campaign uses fake Zillow apartment-review pages to get renters to paste a PowerShell command that installs NetSupport RAT, remote-control software that restarts at every login.

ClickFix is a social-engineering technique that tells a visitor to fix a supposed problem or pass a verification by running a command on their own computer. NetSupport RAT is NetSupport Manager, legitimate remote administration software, used here as a remote access trojan: a tool that lets an attacker control the computer. Certificate Transparency logs are the public record of issued TLS certificates, which researchers searched to find more domains.

Analysis based on EfficientIP Research Labs research published on 12 November 2026. The research does not name a threat actor. A related Threat Watch article covers a ClickFix page that hides a crypto skimmer in a public Google Sheet.

Aug 2026
when EfficientIP first detected domains behind the campaign, per Help Net Security
3
keystrokes the page asks for: Win+R, Ctrl+V, Enter
7
apartments-review domains in the researchers' table of landing pages
9
gateway domains in the same table, on two IP addresses

Source: EfficientIP Research Labs, 12 November 2026. The counts 7 and 9 are AegisAI's counts of the rows in its table.

Key judgments

  • The visitor does the installing. Clicking Continue copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard and the page asks for Win+R, Ctrl+V and Enter. EfficientIP describes no attachment and no browser exploit.
  • The payload is a real product used for the wrong job. NetSupport Manager is legitimate remote administration software, so its files can look ordinary on a work computer.
  • It survives a restart. The script drops a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder that launches the client at each logon, with the window hidden.
  • The delivery route was not observed. EfficientIP's CISO told Help Net Security that links sent directly to targets by email, SMS or a messaging app are the most likely route, with ads and redirects less likely and search poisoning least likely.
  • On a work laptop, the harm is company data. EfficientIP says remote control could expose information within the compromised user's permissions. It does not establish a confirmed victim or confirmed data theft.

Evaluating email security tools? The 2026 Buyer's Guide to Email Security has nine evaluation areas and the questions to ask vendors. Get the guide.

How does a fake Zillow review page install NetSupport RAT?

EfficientIP found recently registered .sbs domains that pose as Zillow apartment-review pages. Each reproduced the same design and used the same ClickFix check. The chain runs in seven steps.

  1. A page shaped like a Zillow review listing shows a verification prompt with a Continue button.
  2. Clicking Continue copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard. The page tells the visitor to press Win+R, Ctrl+V and Enter.
  3. The command downloads a script named winup2 from an address written as the decimal number 1495423691, which converts to 89.34.90.203. It saves the script to the temp folder and runs it.
  4. The script relaunches PowerShell with the window hidden and sets %APPDATA%\NetSupport as the install folder.
  5. It writes an embedded Python script and runs it with a Python runtime it has downloaded. The Python code fetches mestos2.zip from the same IP address.
  6. The archive is unpacked into %APPDATA%\NetSupport. The script finds Service.exe and creates a shortcut, NetSupport.lnk, in the Startup folder.
  7. It starts the payload with its window hidden. The client's configuration names two gateway domains, asgomd[.]com and asgrsv[.]com.

Source: EfficientIP Research Labs, 12 November 2026, PowerShell Downloader Analysis.

What the visitor sees and what happens

The table pairs each moment on screen with the action behind it. It is AegisAI's arrangement of the EfficientIP description.

MomentWhat the visitor seesWhat is happening
LinkA message about apartment reviews or a check before a visitThe delivery route was not observed; direct links are the most likely, per EfficientIP's CISO
PageA Zillow-style review page with a verification promptA short-lived .sbs domain behind Cloudflare
ContinueA button and three keyboard stepsA PowerShell command is copied to the clipboard
PasteThe Run dialog closesA script is fetched from a bare IP address and run from the temp folder
AfterNothing visibleNetSupport runs hidden and restarts at each login

Where the lure touches email

EfficientIP did not observe how victims reached the pages. Its CISO told Help Net Security that email, SMS and messaging apps are the likeliest channels, in a rental-scam setting such as a fake landlord or agent asking for a check before a visit. Only the email case reaches a corporate mailbox. This section is AegisAI's reading: a person on a work laptop who gets such a link by email is the case an email control can see.

How do the attackers keep rebuilding the infrastructure?

The domains were disposable. Help Net Security reports that they were registered under .sbs, followed one pattern, and used wildcard subdomains such as verify.apartments-review[.]sbs, which the CISO called typical of unique per-target or per-campaign links.

That left little for a live lookup to find. The domains lived briefly and sat behind Cloudflare, which hid the hosting. EfficientIP started from a small set in its passive DNS data, which records which names resolved to which addresses over time. It then searched Certificate Transparency logs for the same naming pattern and found more apartments-review domains that its DNS data had missed.

The domains did not consistently share nameservers and resolved to different Cloudflare addresses. EfficientIP linked them through the same fake Zillow template and ClickFix mechanism, the same encoded IP and download path, and a common NetSupport deployment. It says shared Cloudflare addresses alone would not establish the link.

How the gateway domains were found

The installed NetSupport client names asgomd[.]com and asgrsv[.]com. EfficientIP's CISO told Help Net Security that pivoting on their IP addresses revealed seven more domains with the same short naming style, such as bksju, decrmd, jpgomd, nogomd, decrsv and jpgrsv. The shared "-md" and "-rsv" endings suggest one set of gateway infrastructure for one operator, in his words. No threat actor is named, and NetSupport licenses are widely reused, so a license string alone is a weak attribution signal.

How can an organization spot a fake verification check?

Look at what the page asks the person to do, not at how the page looks. EfficientIP's own advice and the reported chain suggest controls at five points.

ControlWhat it sees in this campaignResult
Block list of known domainsDomains that follow the apartments-review pattern, once identifiedHelps, but domains are short-lived and new ones appear
DNS filteringThe page and gateway domains, if listedDoes not stop the download, which connects to a bare IP address
Alert on scripts launched from the Run dialogA hidden PowerShell run from Win+R that fetches a scriptCan stop the install
Monitor for unexpected remote administration toolsA NetSupport folder in AppData and a Startup shortcutCan expose a completed install
Reading the message and its linkAn unsolicited link to a newly registered lookalike domainCan be flagged when it arrives by email

AegisAI's reading of the reported chain. The block list, DNS, endpoint and training advice follows EfficientIP's recommendations.

A routine apartment search, a polite verification prompt and three keystrokes. Every step looks like a chore, until the pasted command runs.

AegisAI Threat Intelligence

What this means for a security team

This section is AegisAI's analysis. The page is aimed at renters, but EfficientIP's point is that a personal search on a work laptop can expose company files within the user's permissions. The exposure does not depend on the page being work related.

Three questions settle the exposure: whether staff may run scripts from the Run dialog on a work device, whether an unapproved remote administration tool would raise an alert, and whether a link to a newly registered domain that reaches a work mailbox is read before it is clicked.

Why standard controls miss it

This section is AegisAI's analysis. The page has no attachment to scan and no exploit to patch, and the visitor starts the command themselves. The payload is a genuine remote administration product, and the downloader connects to a bare IP address, so DNS filtering never sees that step. The reported domains were also short-lived, so a list of known domains trails the attacker.

How AegisAI protects against it

AegisAI has not observed this campaign. EfficientIP did not see how victims reached the pages, so the approach below applies only where a link to such a page arrives in a mailbox, the case its CISO listed first among the likely routes. It does not apply to SMS or messaging apps.

AegisAI's agents evaluate the message and the destination it points to together, and pull a malicious message out of mailboxes before users see or click it. More on how that works: inbound email security.

When a lure or a compromised session is caught, the response compounds: the message is withheld at classification, copies already delivered are retracted, rewritten links refuse a late visit, the account's outbound and internal mail gets rescanned, and lateral phishing attempts to colleagues are blocked at the same bar rather than treated as a fresh, unrelated message.

How AegisAI stops credential phishing, 48 second video

How AegisAI stops credential phishing, 48 seconds

Recommendations for defenders

  • Alert on or block PowerShell launched from the Run dialog, especially with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and a hidden window, and on a Python runtime unpacked into a temp folder.
  • Inventory remote administration tools and alert on any that are not approved, such as a NetSupport folder under AppData or a Startup shortcut that points to Service.exe.
  • Block the reported domains and IP addresses as historical indicators, and add DNS filtering, knowing that it does not stop the direct-IP download.
  • Train staff that no real verification or review page asks for a command to be pasted into a system tool, and give them one place to report such pages.
  • Treat a personal rental search on a work laptop as in scope for monitoring, since the files available to the signed-in user are the company's.

FAQ

What is the fake Zillow ClickFix campaign?

It is a campaign in which fake Zillow apartment-review pages show a verification check, copy a PowerShell command to the clipboard and ask the visitor to run it with Win+R, Ctrl+V and Enter. The command installs NetSupport RAT and a Startup shortcut, according to EfficientIP Research Labs' 12 November 2026 research.

How do I tell a real verification check from a ClickFix one?

A real check does not ask you to open the Run dialog or a terminal and paste a command. Treat any page that does as hostile, close it, and report it to your security team. This is AegisAI's general guidance, and EfficientIP's own advice is to train staff to recognize and report pages that ask for pasted commands.

What should I do if I already ran the command?

EfficientIP's research includes no removal walkthrough. It does say where the tool lands: a NetSupport folder in AppData and a NetSupport shortcut in the Startup folder. Tell your IT or security team at once, disconnect the computer from the network, and change passwords from a different device. The steps are AegisAI's general guidance.

Is NetSupport Manager itself malware?

No. NetSupport Manager is legitimate remote administration software, which is why EfficientIP calls this campaign an abuse of it. Used with a hidden window and a Startup shortcut after a pasted command, it works as a remote access trojan.

For researchers

What the reporting does not tell us 4 gaps

Delivery. The researchers worked from the infrastructure side and did not see how victims reached the pages. The email, SMS and messaging-app route is an assessment by EfficientIP's CISO, not an observation.

Victims. EfficientIP says the investigation does not establish an actual victim or confirmed data theft. Its daily passive DNS counts are observations, not confirmed victims or infections.

Attribution. No threat actor or group is named. The activity is described as part of the wider ClickFix and NetSupport ecosystem.

Indicator lifespan. EfficientIP says the infrastructure continues to change. The domains lived for days, so any single domain ages quickly.

Reported indicators 9 items

Indicators from the EfficientIP research, defanged. Infrastructure changes quickly: treat these as historical indicators, not a live blocklist. Cloudflare addresses in the researchers' table may also serve unrelated sites and are left out.

TypeIndicatorRole
Domain patternapartments-review[0-9]+[.]sbsFake Zillow landing pages
Domainverify.apartments-review8509831[.]sbsExample wildcard subdomain of a landing page
IP address89.34.90[.]203Script and archive download, written as 1495423691 in the command
Domainasgomd[.]com, asgrsv[.]comGateway domains in the NetSupport client configuration
Domainbksju[.]com, bksnb[.]com, decrmd[.]com, jpgomd[.]com, nogomd[.]com, decrsv[.]com, jpgrsv[.]comRelated gateway domains found by pivoting
IP address45.227.254[.]179Hosts asgomd, bksju, bksnb, decrmd, jpgomd and nogomd
IP address45.227.254[.]10Hosts asgrsv, decrsv and jpgrsv
Filewinup2.ps1, mestos2.zip, Service.exeScript in the temp folder, archive and client executable
Path%APPDATA%\NetSupport, NetSupport.lnkInstall folder and Startup shortcut
MITRE ATT&CK mapping 5 techniques

These techniques are AegisAI's mapping of the EfficientIP description. IDs and names were checked against attack.mitre.org on 15 November 2026.

IDNameUse in this campaign
T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: DomainsShort-lived apartments-review domains and gateway domains are registered.
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and PasteThe visitor pastes a copied command into the Run dialog.
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellThe command and the downloaded script run in PowerShell.
T1219Remote Access ToolsNetSupport Manager, legitimate remote administration software, gives the attacker control.
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderA Startup shortcut launches the client at each logon.
References 3 sources
  • EfficientIP Research Labs (12 November 2026). From Fake Zillow Pages to ClickFix NetSupport RAT. efficientip.com
  • Help Net Security (13 November 2026). Fake Zillow pages use ClickFix NetSupport RAT to target apartment hunters. Used for the August 2026 detection date and the assessments by EfficientIP's CISO. helpnetsecurity.com
  • MITRE ATT&CK. Techniques T1583.001, T1204.004, T1059.001, T1219 and T1547.001. attack.mitre.org

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