AegisAI Perspectives · 092

How do manufacturers stop attackers changing staff direct deposit details by email?

Manufacturers stop direct deposit change scams by refusing email-only requests, calling staff on a number on file, and locking down HR mail and portals.

How do manufacturers stop attackers changing staff direct deposit details by email?

Manufacturers stop attackers changing staff direct deposit details by email by refusing email-only changes and calling the employee back on a number on file, the secondary channel the FBI advised in 201910. The same FBI alert found direct deposit change request losses rose more than 815 percent between January 2018 and June 20198. AegisAI lists an “employee” changing direct deposit among the attacks its AI agents check against the sender’s history21.

What you can do by the end

  • Write a plant rule that holds every emailed direct deposit change until a callback on a number on file.
  • Switch off external forwarding on HR and payroll mailboxes in Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace.
  • Require phishing-resistant MFA on payroll and HR portal logins, with security keys where the portal accepts them.

How does a direct deposit change scam reach a plant HR inbox?

Payroll diversion reaches a manufacturer's HR inbox by one of two routes. In the first, phishing emails capture an employee's login credentials4. Direct deposits are then changed and redirected to an account controlled by the cybercriminal5.

In the second, an attacker emails HR or payroll posing as the employee, with no login stolen, the same payroll diversion scheme universities face. The new direct deposit information generally leads to a pre-paid card account9.

The FBI IC3 lists 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 20251, with losses of $3,046,598,5582. The 2024 figures in the same table are 21,442 complaints and $2,770,151,1463.

Set up these direct deposit controls at the plant

Set these seven controls in this order, starting with the written rule that every later control backs up.

  1. Write the rule.

    HR accepts no direct deposit change by email alone, from anyone, including a supervisor writing for a crew member. The FBI advises secondary channels or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information.

  2. Call back on a number on file.

    HR calls the employee on the phone number in the HR record, never a number in the email, during the employee's own shift. For night shift staff, use the shift supervisor's desk phone as the second channel.

  3. Send a notice to the employee.

    Mail or text a notice to the employee's existing contact on file the day a change is entered, and hold the first deposit to the new account until the employee confirms. Treat a new account that is a pre-paid card as a reason to stop the change.

  4. Require MFA on HR and payroll portals.

    The FBI names two-factor authentication as one way to verify a request to change account information. Google calls security keys the strongest 2-Step Verification method19. In Google Workspace, make 2-Step Verification required for HR and payroll users18.

  5. Watch HR mailboxes for forwarding rules.

    In Microsoft 365, set automatic forwarding in the outbound spam filter policy to Off (Forwarding is disabled). Check the Auto forwarded messages report each week for HR and payroll mailboxes16. In Google Workspace, turn user automatic forwarding off in the Admin console17.

  6. Flag portal logins outside the shift.

    The FBI advises monitoring employee logins that occur outside normal business hours6. At a plant, compare each payroll portal login with the employee's shift schedule, and call back a day shift worker who logs in at 3 a.m.

  7. Train HR and payroll staff on the pattern.

    Show them the warning signs: a change sent by email, a new bank that is a pre-paid card, and a sender who cannot be reached on the number on file. Tell staff on shared break room kiosks to open the payroll portal from the kiosk bookmark and never from an emailed link, since the scheme starts with stolen credentials.

Who owns each direct deposit control at a plant?

Give each control one named owner.

ControlWho owns it at a plantWhat it stops
Written rule: no change by email alonePlant HR managerFake employee requests that lead to a pre-paid card
Callback on a number on filePayroll clerk, with the shift supervisor on nightsRequests from a lookalike or stolen address
Notice to the employee's contact on filePayroll clerkA redirected deposit the employee never asked for
MFA on HR and payroll portalsIT adminLogins with credentials captured by phishing emails
Forwarding set to OffIT adminInbox rules that copy HR mail to an external address
Login review against shift schedulesIT admin and shift supervisorsPortal logins outside normal hours for that employee
Pattern trainingPlant HR managerStaff typing portal logins into phishing pages

Follow one fake direct deposit request through a plant

Illustrative example, figures are fictional. Ridgeline Castings (fictional) runs a 400-person plant on three shifts, with one HR generalist and one payroll clerk, plus a single IT admin. At 2:40 a.m. on a Tuesday, the HR inbox gets an email from a night shift supervisor asking to move his direct deposit to a new bank before Friday's payroll. The sender domain swaps the letter i in the company name for an l. At 7:30 a.m. the payroll clerk applies the written rule: no change by email alone. At 11 p.m., when his shift starts, she calls the supervisor on the mobile number in his HR record, and he says he sent nothing. The Auto forwarded messages report shows 0 HR mailboxes forwarding outside the company. Friday's deposit goes to the supervisor's old account.

How AegisAI handles this

AI agents check every payment request against the sender’s history, and stop the business email compromise that authentication lets through20. AegisAI reads the thread the way an analyst would: the sender’s history, the change being asked for, and where the reply actually goes22. AegisAI connects by API and works after delivery23. The median verdict takes 1.9 seconds, then the email is removed from every mailbox that received it.

How to measure it in 30 days

Track these three numbers each week from the day the rule goes live.

  • Direct deposit change requests received by email, and how many got a callback on a number on file, from the payroll change log.
  • HR and payroll mailboxes forwarding to external recipients, from the Auto forwarded messages report or the Google Admin console forwarding setting.
  • HR and payroll users with 2-Step Verification or MFA turned on, from the Google Admin console or the payroll portal's admin page.

To see an emailed direct deposit request checked against the sender’s history in your own tenant, use the demo page.

Questions people ask

How do manufacturers stop attackers changing staff direct deposit details by email?

They accept no direct deposit change by email alone and call the employee back on a number on file. They add 2-Step Verification on payroll portals, automatic forwarding set to Off on HR mailboxes, and a notice to the employee's contact on file for every change.

What does a fake direct deposit change email look like?

It reads as a routine request from an employee or supervisor, sent from a lookalike or stolen address. The FBI describes phishing emails that capture the employee's login credentials before the change.

Can hourly staff change direct deposit at a shared kiosk?

Yes, through the payroll portal with MFA, and never through an emailed link. The FBI describes phishing emails built to capture employee logins. Google rates security keys the strongest 2-Step Verification method, and an admin can make 2-Step Verification required for users.

Which forwarding setting should HR and payroll mailboxes use?

Use Off for automatic forwarding in the Microsoft 365 outbound spam filter policy. Off disables Inbox rules that forward to external addresses. In Google Workspace, turn user automatic forwarding off in the Admin console.

How common are direct deposit change scams now?

The FBI IC3 lists 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with $3,046,598,558 in losses. Its 2019 alert reported that direct deposit change request losses rose more than 815 percent from January 2018 to June 2019.

Where should a plant report payroll diversion?

File a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov and write payroll diversion in the body of the complaint. Call the bank that received the deposit the same day.

Sources

  1. (FBI IC3, PSA I-091019-PSA on business email compromise)
  2. (FBI IC3, Payroll diversion PSA I-091818-PSA)
  3. (FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report)
  4. (Microsoft Learn, Control external email forwarding)
  5. (Google Workspace Admin Help, Let users automatically forward their own Gmail emails)
  6. (Google Workspace Admin Help, Protect your business with 2-Step Verification)
  7. (AegisAI BEC and vendor fraud protection page)
  8. (AegisAI Perspectives, Email security for manufacturing companies)
  9. (AegisAI Perspectives, How universities stop payroll diversion and gift card scams)
  10. (AegisAI, Request a demo)

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